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TYING, COMPATIBILITY AND PLANNED OBSOLESCENCE
CHUN-HUI MIAO y
According to the hypothesis of planned obsolescence, a durable goods monopolist
without commitment power has an excessive incentive to introduce new products that
make old units obsolete, and this reduces its overall protability. In this paper, I re-
consider the above hypothesis by examining the role of competition in a monopolist's
upgrade decision. I nd that, when a system add-on is competitively supplied, a monop-
olist chooses to tie the add-on to a new system that is only backward compatible, even
if a commitment of not introducing the new system is available and socially optimal.
Tying facilitates a price squeeze.
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and the 2007 International Industrial Organization Conference, two anonymous referees and the Editor for helpful
comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are mine.
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When a model was settled upon then every improvement on that model
should be interchangeable with the old model, so that a car should never
get out of date.
Henry Ford, My Life and Work, Chapter III, 1922.
Consumers clearly think the price/value proposition of a Windows up-
grade is excellent. Millions have bought upgrades, even though their PCs
would continue to operate perfectly with their original operating system.
Bill Gates, 'Compete, Don't Delete', The Economist, June 13, 1998.
I. INTRODUCTION
CONSIDER A MONOPOLY SYSTEM MAKER in a market that lasts two peri-
ods. In the rst period the rm sells the rst-generation of its system A; which
is perfectly durable. In the second period the rm develops a new feature, B. It
can either sell B as a separate product or sell a new system (A0B) that integrates
B. Which way is more protable? In this paper, I show that when competing
with an independent supplier of B; a system maker earns a higher prot by selling
A0B that is only backward compatible with A; even though selling B as a separate
product is socially optimal.
Many durable goods producers frequently introduce upgrades that incorporate
new features. Rather than offering a new feature as a separate product, rms often
integrate it into a new system and make it unavailable to owners of the old system.
For instance, whenMicrosoft releasedWindows XP, a number of applications such
as Windows Media Player 8, Windows Movie Maker and Wireless Conguration
Utility were introduced, but they could not be installed on previous versions of
Windows.1 In order to use these applications, a user would have to upgrade the
whole operating system.2
Since many of the new features can be unbundled from the Windows operat-
ing system and each of them can be sold as an individual application, how does
Microsoft gain an advantage by tying them to the purchase of a new system? Cer-
tainly there are technical reasons why upgrades are delivered this way, especially
if an upgrade is a complete overhaul of the original system that cannot be ac-
complished by merely adding individual applications. The main contribution of
this paper is to show that, even when technically feasible, a monopoly system
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maker may choose not to offer new features separately from the system because
tying allows the monopolist to exploit network externalities and extract rents from
third-party providers.
I rst examine the case in which a monopoly system maker is also the only
supplier of an application and consumers differ in their willingnesses to pay for
the application. When there are network effects between users of the same sys-
tem, tying the application to the purchase of a new system that is only backward
compatible increases sales, as even low-valuation consumers upgrade for fear of
losing network benets. However, forward-looking consumers will pay less for
the original system thus lowering the monopolist's overall protability. Therefore,
a monopolist will commit not to introduce bundled upgrades.
I then turn to the case in which the monopoly system maker faces competition
from an independent supplier in the application market, a case that is more relevant
to Microsoft. I nd that a commitment to tying emerges as a protable strategy.
By integrating its application into a new system, the system maker turns the com-
petition between two applications into a competition between two systems. This
change intensies the competition for market share, crucial in the presence of net-
work externalities, and lowers the prices of applications thus allowing the system
maker to charge a higher price for the original system. In other words, the system
maker uses tying to engage in a price squeeze (Ordover, Sykes and Willig [1985])
and capture the surplus created by entry of the independent supplier. I nd that
this price squeeze strategy is most effective when the new system is only backward
compatible, but it lowers social welfare.
In both cases, tying entails (full) incompatibility between the system maker's
own application and its old system. This, coupled with incompatibility between
the two systems,3 changes a user's incentive to upgrade. Without tying, a user
can buy the application and keep the old system, hence all users remain on the
same network and reap maximal network benets. Tying induces users who have
higher values for the application to migrate to a new system, thus depriving non-
upgrading users of network benets. This forces some users to buy the upgrade
they don't need or buy the 'wrong upgrade' if there are competing offers.
The traditional explanation for bundling is that it serves as an effective tool
of price discrimination by a monopolist (Adams and Yellen [1976], Schmalensee
[1982], McAfee, McMillan andWhinston [1989], Bakos and Brynjolfsson [1999],
but this does not explain the use of pure bundling because mixed bundling gives
the monopolist more freedom to price discriminate.
Following the seminal contribution by Whinston [1990], a number of papers
(Choi and Stefanadis [2001], Carlton and Waldman [2002; 2006], Nalebuff [2004])
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demonstrate the use of tying to extend a rm's monopoly power from one mar-
ket to another.4 However, they have had limited success in explaining Microsoft's
tying behavior. Their models assume a physical tie that involves incompatibil-
ity with a rival's product, but Microsoft seems to have introduced relatively little
incompatibility between its operating system and third-party applications (Whin-
ston [2001]). These models also rely on the entry deterrence effect of tying,5 but
its rivals were already active in their respective markets when Microsoft started
the practice.6 These facts, however, are consistent with my model, which suggests
that tying can facilitate rent extraction by a monopoly system maker, who there-
fore has an incentive to accommodate entry. In this sense, my paper is close in
spirit to Farrell and Katz [2000], who study a single producer of component A and
several independent suppliers of a complementary component B. They show that
the monopolist may have incentives to integrate into supply of component B so as
to better extract efciency rents in the competitive sector.
The idea that tying can facilitate a price squeeze has also been independently
developed by Gans [2007] and Carlton, Gans and Waldman [2007]. In both their
models and mine, tying can be inefcient even when it does not lead to foreclo-
sure. However, there are two key differences between their models and mine: rst,
in their models tying is used only if the tie creates economic value and thus is so-
cially efcient in the absence of a rival producer; second, tying in their models
is equivalent to bundling hence unbundling such as the one mandated by the Eu-
ropean Commission may have a positive effect on welfare, but in mine tying is
mainly a commitment of incompatibility hence an order to unbundle but without
compatibility requirement is completely ineffective.7
There is an extensive literature on competition between networks, but most of
it focuses on the coordination-game aspect and considers network effects that are
signicant enough to generate a winner-takes-all outcome. Relatively few mod-
els examine competitions with weak network externalities that lead to segmented
networks, despite their wide existence. A recent paper by Grilo, Shy and Thisse
[2001] studies a spatial duopoly model with consumption externalities. They nd
that, when the network effect is present but not too strong, product differentiation
can sustain both rms but price competition is ercer and results in lower prices.8
A similar result is obtained in my paper.
Finally, the idea that a durable goods producer with network externalities may
choose to make a new product incompatible with its old ones is related to the lit-
erature on planned obsolescence, originated by Waldman [1993] and Choi [1994].9
They nd that a monopolist has an excessive incentive to introduce new products
that make old units obsolete, and this reduces its overall protability. Therefore,
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the monopolist may be better off by committing itself not to offer the new product.
More closely related to my paper is the second model of Ellison and Fudenberg
[2000],10 which attributes excessive upgrades to consumer heterogeneity: a mo-
nopolist's incentive to upgrade depends on the marginal consumer's valuation,
but social welfare depends on the average consumer, therefore the monopolist's
choice generally deviates from the social optimal. My paper extends their paper
in two directions. First, my model highlights the role of tying and endogenizes
the monopolist's choice of compatibility.11 Second, following their suggestion,
I consider the role of competition in the market for upgrades; this allows me to
show that a monopoly system maker may introduce inefcient upgrades, even if a
commitment not to do so is available and socially optimal.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II provides some
evidence to motivate my model. Section III introduces the basic model. Section
IV examines the commitment problem of a monopoly system maker when it is
also the only supplier of applications. Section V analyzes the choices of tying and
compatibility by a monopoly system maker when it competes with an independent
supplier of applications. Section VI considers several extensions. Section VII
concludes.
II. MOTIVATION
In this section, I briey review two cases that seemed to broadly t the assump-
tions of this paper: both rms sell systems that constitute a platform for applica-
tions; both are dominant players in their respective markets; product innovations
are rapid and users place considerable emphasis on compatibility between gener-
ations of products. It is worth noting, however, many details in these cases are
not captured by the simple model presented in this paper, and no claim is made
to explain fully the observed behavior. Rather, the cases are used to motivate the
central thesis of this paper that the choices of tying and compatibility is as much a
way to change the rules of the game in the application market as it is determined
by technology advances in systems.
II(i). Microsoft's Tying Strategy
Microsoft's bundling of numerous applications into its Windows operating system
has been well documented, but one aspect of its tying strategy has largely escaped
notice: Microsoft applications bundled in a new system are often unavailable to
users of old systems, who therefore must upgrade their systems in order to use
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these applications. While this upgrading strategy can be dictated by technical
considerations, the following evidence suggests economic motives may also play
a role.
First, there is anecdotal evidence that Microsoft intentionally cripples soft-
ware programs so that they cannot be installed on old operating systems. In one
instance, after removing one line of code that checks the version of Windows,
users are able to install Windows Defender, a security software, onto Windows
2000 despite Microsoft's claim to the contrary.12
Second, third-party applications have been able to provide better compatibility
with different versions of the Windows operating system than Microsoft's own
applications. Take for example media players:13 the left column in Table I lists
the dates and system requirements of major releases of Windows Media Player
(WMP) and its main competitor, RealPlayer, in the last decade;14 the right column
is derived from the left and lists the 'obsolescence dates' of Windows operating
systems, dened as the release date of a media player that discontinues its support
of the OS.15
 Place Table I about here. 
An interesting pattern emerges: RealPlayer consistently supports more ver-
sions of the Windows OS than Microsoft's own WMP, although Microsoft often
rationalizes its bundling strategy by claiming that its own applications can best
utilize the operating system. In July 2000, Microsoft released WMP 7, which
was bundled into Windows ME but could not be installed on Windows 95.16 Al-
most concurrently, RealPlayer 8 was released and still supported Windows 95.
The introduction of WMP 8 and RealPlayer 9, by Microsoft and RealNetworks
respectively, follows a similar pattern.
II(ii). SAP's Commitment to a 'Stable Core'
In contrast, SAP AG, a leading provider of business software, recently announced
a major shift in its upgrading strategy. It promised to keep the current version of
its agship product, mySAP ERP 2005, in place for the next 5 years, breaking
with the traditional approach of upgrading the entire software release every 12 to
18 months.17 The company would instead release optional enhancement packages
that add new functionalities in certain business areas. Customers can cherry-pick
the ones they want to implement and ignore ones they do not. In other words,
customers can access new features without overhauling their core systems.
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Notably, SAP's change in upgrading policy took place after a period of rapid
consolidation, during which many software vendors that specialize in particular
applications exit the industry amid a tech slump.18
In sum, two observations can be made from the above cases: rst, a system
maker may have an incentive to introduce incompatibility between its own appli-
cations and systems; second, the incentive to tie applications to a new system is
stronger as the potential for add-on competition rises.19 A model that attempts to
account for these observations is presented below.
III. BASIC SETUP
I consider a two-period model, with periods t = 1 and t = 2 (see Figure 1). In
period 1, a monopolist produces the rst generation of the system (A). In period
2, the monopolist develops a new application; it can either introduce a system
upgrade that integrates the application (A0B) or sell the application as a separate
product (B).20 If it chooses the rst option, the monopolist can also manipulate
the degree of compatibility between the new system, A0B; and the old system, A.
I assume that both developing an application and developing an upgrade involve
xed costs that are so small as not to affect the monopolist's upgrade decision.21
In addition, I normalize the marginal costs of all production to zero.
 Place Figure 1 about here. 
There is a continuum of consumers who enter the market in period 1: Each
consumer buys at most one unit of A in period 1 and one unit of either B or
A0B in period 2. I assume that consumers have quasi-linear preferences, so their
utilities can be measured in monetary units.
To model network externalities, I assume that users of each system constitute a
network and that a member of network i derives a network benet ofN(
MX
j=1
aijxj)
from M available networks, where xj is the number of users on network j and
aij is the network effect from network j to members of network i: I assume that
N(0) = 0; N 0 > 0; aij 2 [0; 1], and aii = 1 for all i: I allow for partial compatibil-
ity, i.e., aij < 1 for some j 6= i:When aij takes the value of either 0 or 1; I obtain
three special cases discussed in the literature:
 Full compatibility, aij = 1 for all i and j:
 Full incompatibility, aij = 0 for all j 6= i:
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 One-way compatibility, aij = 0 and aji = 1; e.g., users of network i benet
only from other users of the same network, while users of network j get the
full network benets from users of both networks; if network j is a newer ver-
sion of the system than network i, then one-way compatibility implies back-
ward but not forward compatibility.
I assume that the 'base value', independent of network externalities, of A0B is
the sum of two components, vA0B = vA+u; where vA is the base value of A and u
is the value ofB. This specication means that, compared withB; the introduction
of A0B adds nothing but a channel through which A is made obsolete.22 It is in
this sense that an upgrade (A ! A0) is called inefcient. I further assume that
vA is the same across all consumers. This assumption guarantees that consumers'
valuations of A0B are perfectly correlated with their valuations of B. Besides
simplifying the analysis, this assumption ensures that the incentive to bundle B
cannot be attributed to price discrimination. I also suppose that vA is so high that
all consumers make purchases in the rst period (no monopoly exclusion). It is
easy to see that the absolute size of vA as well as the rst-period network benets
are immaterial to my analysis, so I normalize them to 0 in order to cut down the
number of parameters of which we keep track. For the same reason, I suppose that
there is no discount between periods for both consumers and rms.
Last, I assume that the monopolist can prevent consumers from delaying their
purchases by offering an upgrade price only available to owners of the rst-generation
system,23 but the upgrade price is not set until period 2.24
III(i). Compatibility
Before proceeding to my analysis, I pause a moment to discuss the link between
tying and compatibility. Whinston [1990] argues that the effectiveness of ty-
ing largely depends on whether a system maker can make a commitment to tie
through product design, in particular its choice of compatibility. This means that
the tying decision, at its core, is a choice of compatibility. In this paper, it is the
(in)compatibility between the application, B; and the original system, A: Note
that this is different from the choice of compatibility between the two systems,
A0B and A : while the former necessitates a competition between the two sys-
tems, the latter regulates the intensity of that competition. At the same time, both
can potentially, and indeed do in this paper, lead to incompatibility between a
system maker's own products.
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IV. MONOPOLY PRICING
In this section I show that, when consumers differ in their willingness to pay for
B, a monopolist increases its second-period prot by tying B to the purchase of a
system upgrade that is only backward compatible. This, however, lowers the mo-
nopolist's overall protability, therefore it has an incentive to make a commitment
not to tie. To model consumer heterogeneity, I assume that their reservation prices
of B are represented by the distribution F (u), strictly increasing with continuous
density on the closed interval [a; b].
IV(i). The Second Period
In period 2, if the monopolist sellsB, then all users will keep the original systemA
and stay on the same network; a consumer of type u obtains a utility ofN(1) from
continued use of A and obtains u + N(1) from adding B. But if the monopolist
sells A0B, then there will be two networks of users. Let users of A0B be network 1
and those ofA be network 2; a consumer of type u obtains a utility ofN(
2X
j=1
a2jxj)
from continued use of A and obtains u+N(
2X
j=1
a1jxj) from upgrading to A0B.25
Because of the coordination-game aspect of network effects, it is possible
that multiple equilibria exist. Moreover, consumers with different valuations may
not have the same ordering of the possible equilibria, so one cannot use a Pareto
criterion to select between the equilibria. Following Ellison and Fudenberg [2000],
I assume that network effects are so small compared to other factors that the up-
grade price leads to a unique equilibrium allocation,26 in which only users who
value A0B above some ~u choose to upgrade.
The monopolist's problem involves two choices: tying and compatibility, but
only the latter is pivotal according to the following equivalence result.
Lemma 1. Selling B is equivalent to selling A0B that is fully compatible with A.27
Proof. Obvious.
If A0B is fully compatible with A, then consumers receive the same network
benets from using either version, so their upgrade decision will be purely driven
by their valuations of B; whether B is tied makes no difference. Hence we can
focus on the monopolist's choice of compatibility while taking its use of tying
as given. If the solution entails full compatibility, then it implies unbundling as
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another solution. Lemma 1 not only helps me streamline the exposition, but also
shows that tying is an effective strategy only if the system maker can exploit net-
work externalities by manipulating the degree of compatibility between its own
systems.
Proposition 1. The monopolist maximizes its second-period prot by selling A0B
that is only backward compatible, i.e., a12 = 1 and a21 = 0.
Proof. Suppose that the monopolist sells A0B: Without upgrading, a user gets
NfF (~u) + a21[1  F (~u)]g; after upgrading, one gets u  p+Nfa12F (~u) + [1 
F (~u)]g; where p is the price of upgrade. Hence we must have p = Nfa12F (~u) +
[1  F (~u)]g  NfF (~u) + a21[1  F (~u)]g+ ~u and jt=2 =
max~u(Nfa12F (~u) + [1   F (~u)]g   NfF (~u) + a21[1   F (~u)]g + ~u)[1   F (~u)]:
Denote by u the optimal choice of ~u: Applying the envelope theorem, we get
@
@a21
jt=2 =  [1   F (u)]2N 0 < 0 and @@a12jt=2 = F (u)[1   F (u)]N 0 > 0:
Therefore, a choice of a12 = 1 and a21 = 0 (backward compatibility) maximizes
jt=2. We can also rule out selling B alone based on Lemma 1.
The system maker faces a classic time inconsistency problem: once old units
are sold, then a durable goods monopolist has a strong incentive to retire the old
units in order to generate new sales. In my model, the system maker pushes users
to abandon the original system by exploiting network externalities and consumer
heterogeneity. Due to network externalities, the value of a system depends on the
number of users. The upgrading decision of users who have high values for the
application imposes a negative externality on low valuation users, some of whom
are 'forced' to upgrade because it is too costly to be left behind. As a result, the
original system is made obsolete even though it is perfectly durable. My model,
however, does not require the existence of new consumers, as is typically assumed
in models of planned obsolescence.
Example 1. Suppose that u  U [0; 1] and N(x) = nx, where n < 1=2: An
equilibrium in which some but not all users upgrade exists: Further suppose that
n = 1=3: If B is sold as a separate product, then 1=2 of the consumers buy it
and the monopolist earns a prot of 1=4. If B is bundled into a backward but
not forward compatible upgrade A0B, then 3=4 of the consumers upgrade and the
monopolist's prot is 3=8; a 50% increase.
IV(ii). The First Period
The time inconsistency problem faced by the monopolist implies that the policy
optimal in the short term may not be desirable in a long run perspective. Indeed,
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Proposition 2. To maximize total prots, the monopolist commits to either selling
B alone or selling A0B that is fully compatible with A:28
Proof. First, I show that full compatibility maximizes its total prots if the mo-
nopolist can commit to an upgrade price. With tying, a non-upgrading consumer
obtains a network benet of NfF (~u)+ a21[1 F (~u)] in period 2, so the monopo-
list's total prots are  = max~u(Nfa12F (~u) + [1  F (~u)]g  NfF (~u) + a21[1 
F (~u)]g+ ~u)[1  F (~u)] +NfF (~u) + a21[1  F (~u)]g = max~uNfa12F (~u) + [1 
F (~u)]g[1   F (~u)] + F (~u)NfF (~u) + a21[1   F (~u)]g + ~u[1   F (~u)]. By the en-
velope theorem, @@a12 =
@
@a21
= F (~u)[1  F (~u)]N 0 > 0. Therefore, a12 = a21 = 1
(full compatibility) maximizes the monopoly prots. Comparing jt=2 and  when
a12 = a21 = 1; we can see that they differ by a constantN(1): This means that any
upgrade price that maximizes jt=2 also maximizes : Therefore, by committing
to full compatibility, the monopolist can obtain the maximal prot without neces-
sarily committing to an upgrade price. Last, by Lemma 1, selling B alone also
achieves the full compatibility outcome.
The monopolist's incentive to introduce a backward but not forward compati-
ble upgrade has two effects: rst, it reduces a non-upgrading users' network bene-
ts and thus their willingness to pay for the original system; second, the number of
users who upgrade generally deviates from the monopoly prot maximizing quan-
tity. Both contribute to a loss in the monopolist's overall protability. Interest-
ingly, the second effect on social welfare can potentially be positive and therefore
total surplus may be higher or lower from such an upgrade, as shown below.
IV(iii). Welfare
It is clear that marginal cost pricing achieves the rst-best, under which all users
upgrade so the choices of tying and compatibility do not matter. Given the focus of
this paper, however, I examine the welfare implication of tying and compatibility
under monopoly pricing.
The total surplus is TS =
R b
u uf(u)du + [1   F (u)]Nfa12F (u) + [1  
F (u)]g+F (u)NfF (u)+a21[1 F (u)]g = (u)+
R b
u(u u)f(u)du;where
u = argmax~u (~u)jt=2: Hence, @@a21TS = [1   F (u)][N 0F (u)   @u

@a21
]: This
means that the overall effect of compatibility on welfare depends on the compar-
ison between N 0F (u) and @u@a21 ; where N
0F (u) represents its effect on network
benets and @u@a21 represents its effect on the number of upgrading users. Since
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N 0F (u) is positive but @u@a21 can be positive or negative; the total surplus may
increase or decrease with a21; depending upon parameter values.29
Example 2. I continue with the above example, where u  U [0; 1] and N(x) =
x=3: If B is sold as a separate product, then period 1 price is 1=3 and the mo-
nopolist's total prots are 7=12: The total surplus is
R 1
1=2(u   1=2)du + 712 = 1724 :
If B is bundled into a backward but not forward compatible upgrade A0B, then
period 1 price is 1=12 and the monopolist's prot is 11=24. The total surplus isR 1
1=4(u  1=4)du + 1124 = 7196 : In this case, social surplus is lower if B is sold sepa-
rately.
Now suppose that N(x) = x2=4. If B is sold as a separate product, then
1=2 of the consumers upgrade, period 1 price is 1=4 and the monopolist's total
prots are 1=2: The total surplus is
R 1
1=2
 
u  12

du + 12 =
5
8 : If B is bundled into
a backward but not forward compatible upgrade A0B, then 1=3 of the consumers
upgrade, period 1 price is 1=36 and the monopolist's total prots are 43=108. The
total surplus is
R 1
1=3
 
u  13

du+ 43108 =
67
108 : In this case, social surplus is higher if
B is sold separately.
V. A COMPETITIVE SUPPLIER
In the monopoly case, a system maker lowers its own protability with its frequent
upgrades and thus has an incentive to choose actions that constrain its own ability
to introduce upgrades. Since rms like Microsoft do not seem to be taking any
such actions, it is therefore worthwhile to examine their actions from a different
perspective (Waldman [2003]).
Now I turn to the case in which the system maker competes with an inde-
pendent supplier in the application market. I consider the following game (see
Figure 2): the system maker sells A in period 1 and sells B or A0B in period 2;
at the beginning of period 1, the system maker sets the price of A and announces
its choices of tying and compatibility for a future upgrade; consumers then make
purchases; at the beginning of period 2, an independent supplier can enter the mar-
ket by spending F to develop a competing application, B0; also produced at zero
marginal cost. The entry cost F is common knowledge to all participants in the
market.30
 Place Figure 2 about here. 
To study the competition in the application market, I consider a variation of
the standard linear city model. I assume that consumers are uniformly distributed
on a line [0; 1] and that the two rms are located at the opposite ends of the line,
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with the system maker at 0 and the independent supplier at 1. Consumers have the
same reservation price for an application offered by either rm, but a consumer
incurs a transportation cost of td when buying from a rm located at a distance of
d. I assume that F < t=2 so that entry is not blockaded.
Firms set prices simultaneously. I assume that transportation costs are small
compared to a consumer's reservation price so the price competition game has
a pure strategy equilibrium, in which the application market is covered. In ad-
dition, consumers derive network benets from other users of the same system.
For tractability, I assume that network benets are linear in the size of a network,
i.e., N(x) = nx: Again, I assume that network effects are sufciently small, i.e.,
n < t; such that a unique equilibrium exists in which consumers in [0; x] buy
from the system maker (network 1) and consumers in [x; 1] buy from the inde-
pendent supplier (network 2). The solution concept that I use is subgame perfect
equilibrium.
It is easy to see that Lemma 1 still holds in the case studied here, so I focus
on the system maker's choice of compatibility while taking its use of tying as
given. Following Whinston [1990] and Carlton and Waldman [2002, 2006], I also
assume that a tie is irreversible, i.e., if the system maker ties its application to the
purchase of a system, then a consumer cannot undo the tie and use the independent
supplier's application. The case of a reversible tie is discussed in Section VI.D.
V(i). The Second Period
I start by solving the price competition subgame that takes place in the second
period. Denote by pA0B the price of A0B; pB0 the price of B0; mjt=2 the sys-
tem maker's second period prots, and B0 the independent supplier's (post entry)
prots.
Proposition 3. Full compatibility (incompatibility) maximizes (minimizes) mjt=2
and B0:
Proof. Since the tie is irreversible, no one buys both A0B and B0. Hence, in an in-
terior solution, consumers located to the left of some x upgrade to A0B (network
1) whereas others keep A (network 2) and buy B0. We must have  tx   pA0B +
n[a12(1 x)+x] =  t(1 x) pB0+n[(1 x)+a21x]; hence the marginal consumer
is located at x = [pA0B pB0  t+n(1 a12)]=[n(2 a21 a12) 2t] and mjt=2 =
pA0B[pA0B pB0  t+n(1 a12)]=[n(2 a21 a12) 2t]: The system maker's FOC
is pA0B   pB0   t+ n(1  a12) + pA0B = 0: Similarly, we can get B0 = pB0[n(1 
a21)  t pA0B+pB0]=[n(2 a21 a12) 2t] and n(1 a21)  t pA0B+2pB0 = 0:
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Solving, we obtain pB0 = t+
1
3 [n(2a21+a12 3)]; pA0B = t+ 13 [n(a21+2a12 3)];
x = [n3 ( a21+a12) t+n(1 a12)]=[n(2 a21 a12) 2t]; mjt=2 = ft  [n3 (3 
a21 2a12)]g2=[2t n(2 a21 a12)]; and B0 = ft [n3 (3 2a21 a12)]g2=[2t n(2 
a21   a12)]: Differentiating and noting that t > n, we get @@a21mjt=2 = n9 (t  n+
na21) (3t  3n+ 2na12 + na21) = (2t  2n+ na12 + na21)2 > 0; @@a12mjt=2 =
n
9 (3t  3n+ 2na12 + na21) (5t 5n+2na12+3na21)= (2t  2n+ na12 + na21)2 >
0; @@a21B0 =
n
9 (5t  5n+ 2na21 + 3na12) (3t  3n+ 2na21 + na12)
= (2t  2n+ na21 + na12)2 > 0 and
@
@a12
B0 =
n
9 (t  n+ na21) (3t  3n+ na21 + 2na12) = (2t  2n+ na21 + na12)2
> 0. This means that both mjt=2 and B0 are maximized (minimized) at a21 =
a12 = 1 (a21 = a12 = 0):
It is not difcult to see the intuition behind the result. If A0B or AB0 are not
fully compatible, then a user's choice between two applications is also a choice
between two network systems. This means that gaining an additional customer
not only increases a rm's sales but also makes its network more attractive to
other users. Therefore, each rm has a strong incentive to cut price and increase
its market share.31 This intensies competition and lowers both rms' prots.
Corollary 1. The number of users who upgrade to the new system x increases
with a12 but decreases with a21:
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 3, we know that x = [n3 ( a21 + a12)  t+
n(1  a12)]=[n(2  a21   a12)  2t]:
Hence, @x@a12 =
n
3 (t   n + na21)= (2t  2n+ na12 + na21)2 > 0; @x

@a21
=  n3 (t  
n+ na12)= (2t  2n+ na12 + na21)2 < 0:
V(ii). The First Period
In the monopoly case, the system maker reverses its choices of tying and compat-
ibility when it gains the ability to commit. Here again, the system maker faces
a time inconsistency problem: in order to increase a consumer's willingness to
pay for the original system, it may want to lower the prices of applications. From
the proof of Proposition 3, we can see that pB0 = t + n3 (2a21 + a12   3) and
pA0B = t +
n
3 (a21 + 2a12   3); the prices of both applications increase with the
degree of compatibility between systems. This means that, by lowering the degree
of compatibility between systems, the system maker can commit itself to a more
intense price competition in the application market and force its rival to accept
a low price. On the other hand, incompatibility may lead to a loss of network
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benets and reduce a consumer's willingness to pay for the original system. The
right balance requires some degree of incompatibility that minimizes the loss of
network benets. According to Corollary 1, if the new system is only backward
compatible, then the number of users who upgrade will be maximized and the loss
of network benets will be small.
At the same time, the system maker has an incentive to accommodate entry
of its rival, because its existence makes the system more valuable to consumers.
In this way, the system maker can take advantage of its monopoly position in the
system market to capture the additional surplus that its rival's presence generates
(due to product differentiation). Therefore,
Proposition 4. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the system maker com-
mits to selling A0B that is backward but not fully forward compatible and accom-
modates entry. More specically, a12 = 1 and a21 = max(0; a); where a is the
solution to [t  2n3 (1  a)]2= (2t  n(1  a)) = F:
Proof. Suppose that a12 and a21 are chosen such that the independent supplier
does not enter, then the price of the upgrade will be u + n   t so that all users
upgrade. There is no monopoly exclusion because u is high. Hence consumers
are willing to pay 0 for the original system and the system maker's total prof-
its are u + n   t: Suppose that the independent supplier enters, then the mar-
ginal consumer (the user located at x) is willing to pay u + n[x + a12(1  
x)]   tx   pA0B for the original system, where x and pA0B are given in the
proof of Proposition 3. Thus the system maker's total prots are m = u +
n[x + a12(1   x)]   tx   pA0B + mjt=2. Differentiating and noting that t >
n, we get @m@a12 =
n
9 [4n(t   n)(a12 + 2a21) + 6(t   n)2 + n2(2a12a21 + a212 +
3a221)]= (2t  2n+ na12 + na21)2 > 0 and @m@a21 =  2n9 (3t  3n+ 2na12 + na21)
(t  n+ na21) = (2t  2n+ na12 + na21)2 < 0: In addition, we have m(a12 =
a21 = 1) = u + n   t = m(no entry). This means that the system maker bene-
ts from entry of the independent supplier. Since a higher a12 increases both the
independent supplier's and the system maker's prots, we must have a12 = 1: As
for a21; it depends on the size of the entry cost. If F < (t   23n)2=(2t   n); then
the independent supplier always enter regardless of a21 hence it should be set to
0; if F  (t   23n)2=(2t   n); then a21 should be set just high enough such that
B0 = [t   2n3 (1   a21)]2= [2t  n(1  a21)] = F in order to accommodate entry.
This implies backward but not forward compatibility, where users of AB0 receive
only partial benets from users of A0B.
 Place Figure 3 about here. 
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The trade-off faced by the system maker is illustrated in Figure 3, in which
m(entry) (respectively, m(no entry)) denotes the system maker's total prots if
the independent supplier enters (respectively, does not enter) and e denotes the
independent supplier's post-entry prot. On one hand, the system maker benets
from the presence of the independent supplier since m(entry) > m(no entry) for
all values of a21; on the other hand, the system maker's total prots decrease with
a21: At the same time, the independent supplier's post-entry prot increases with
a21. Therefore, the optimal strategy for the system maker is to set a21 just high
enough so that the independent supplier will choose to enter.32
By committing to a tie-in of the application with an upgrade that is only back-
ward compatible, the system maker promises a tough ght with the independent
supplier of applications upon its entry. This increases a consumer's willingness to
pay for the original system and raises the system maker's overall protability at
its rival's expense. In other words, tying enhances the system maker's ability to
engage in a price squeeze: by forcing the independent supplier to charge a lower
price than it otherwise would, the system maker captures surplus created by entry
of the independent supplier.
Here, tying is protable precisely because it gives the system maker the lever-
age to change the rules of the game in the application market. If the system maker
sells its application as a separate product, then the competition in the application
market is just a competition between two differentiated products; but if the system
maker ties the sale of its application to a new system, then users who prefer the
independent supplier will keep the old system whereas users who prefer the sys-
tem maker will have to upgrade to a new system and move to a different network.
Basically, tying turns the competition between two applications into a competition
between two network systems, thus allowing the system maker to take advantage
of its control over the system design and its ability to manipulate the degree of
compatibility.
The above result contrasts with that of Whinston [1990], who shows under a
wide variety of conditions that a monopolist cannot gain from tying complemen-
tary products used in xed proportions. The key difference is the inter-temporal
nature of my model. Note that tying is not protable if the system maker can
commit to a low upgrade price and use it to engage in a perfect price squeeze.
In Whinston's model, a commitment in price is readily available because compo-
nents of a system are offered all at once. In my model, however, an upgrade is
offered after the system purchase and a commitment in the upgrade price may not
be feasible.33;34 Therefore, a system maker has to resort to tying, which partially
restores its ability to engage in a price squeeze.
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My model is also distinctive from existing foreclosure models in terms of the
role of tying: instead of limiting consumers' choices in the application market,
tying is used by a system maker in my model to limit consumers' choices in the
system market among its own products. Note that consumers upgrade to A0B
because B is not available for users of the original system, even though they are
free to add B0 from the independent supplier. To put it another way, it is the
abandonment of old systems, but not the integration with a new system or the
exclusion of rival products, that makes the tie-in of applications so appealing to
the system maker. This distinction implies that policy makers focusing on the
physical integration of applications may have targeted the wrong subject, a point
that I will return to later in this section.
Corollary 2. The system maker's total prots decreases with F:
Proof. First, a increases with F ; second, m decreases with a21 = max(0; a):
Therefore, m (weakly) decreases with F:
Since the system maker can manipulate the degree of compatibility between
its systems such that the independent supplier's post entry prots barely cover
the entry cost, any efciency gain by the independent supplier in the form of a
lower xed cost will be appropriated by the system maker. Therefore, the system
maker may have an incentive to provide open standards in order to facilitate the
development of third-party applications,35 even when it introduces incompatibility
between its own products.
It should be noted that results obtained in this section rely on the assumption
that the system maker can offer an upgrade price only available to owners of the
rst-generation system.36 If the system maker sells an integrated system as an
upgrade in period 2 but cannot price discriminate between upgrading users and
rst-time buyers, then consumers will have an incentive to delay their purchases
thus making the tying strategy less protable. Nevertheless, in durable goods mar-
kets the assumption of price discrimination is quite realistic and it can be easily
implemented by a trade-in program, as shown in Choi [1994] and Fudenberg and
Tirole [1998]. Examples are also abundant. According to Choi [1994], a new re-
lease of Microsoft Windows 3.1 operating system for IBM compatible computers
is list priced at $149.95, but a special upgrade price of $49.99 is also available for
registered users of all Window versions if the master copy of a previous version is
turned in.
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V(iii). Welfare
Whereas the welfare implication of tying and compatibility is ambiguous in the
monopoly case, it is unambiguous in the competitive case: tying the application
into an upgrade that is only backward compatible lowers welfare.37 This is due
to the combination of two effects: rst, forward incompatibility reduces total net-
work benets; second, it distorts some consumers' purchase decisions and in-
creases their transportation costs. In fact,
Proposition 5. Social welfare is maximized when a12 = 1 and a21 = 1:
Proof. The total surplus is determined by both network benets and transporta-
tion costs. It can be written as TS = xNfF (x) + a12[1   F (x)]g + (1  
x)Nfa21F (x) + [1  F (x)]g  
R x
0 txf(x)dx 
R 1
x t(1  x)f(x)dx; where x
is the location of the marginal user and F () is the CDF that represents the distri-
bution of users on the line of [0; 1]. Since f(x) is symmetric, it is easy to see that
TS  N(1)   R x0 txf(x)dx   R 1x t(1   x)f(x)dx  N (1)   R 0:50 txf(x)dx  R 1
0:5 t(1  x)f(x)dx, where the last term is TS(a12 = 1; a21 = 1):
The welfare analysis above suggests that a ban on tie-in of application and sys-
temmay improve social welfare, however, such a ban is effective only if the system
maker starts to offer applications that work with the old system. Otherwise, even
in the absence of physical bundling, a tie remains and may lead to inefcient up-
grades. A case in point is the European Commission's antitrust ruling that orders
Microsoft to offer Windows XP N, a version of Windows XP without a bundled
media player, in European markets. Since Microsoft's new media player is in-
compatible with old versions of Windows, in order to use it, users will still have
to upgrade to Windows XP. In fact, there is virtually no demand for the stripped-
down version, particularly as Microsoft has been allowed to offer Windows XP N
for the same price as the standard version of Windows XP.
It should be noted, however, that EU's ruling is based on theories that are
different from the model presented in this paper. It is therefore not surprising that
the prescription suggested by this analysis also differs from EU's actual ruling.
VI. EXTENSIONS
In this section, I consider extensions of the basic model to check robustness of the
results.
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VI(i). Uncertainty In Consumer Valuation
In the monopoly case of the basic model, consumers' valuations of B are distrib-
uted on the support of [a; b] and each consumer is assumed to know her valuation
when making the initial purchase of the system. This is somewhat unrealistic. In
this extension, I assume that consumers' valuations still have the same distribu-
tion, but a consumer learns her valuation of B only after its introduction by the
monopolist in the second period.
Clearly, this does not change the monopolist's second period problem. Now I
verify that the solution to the monopolist's commitment problem does not change
under the new specication in timing.
In the second period, each consumer in [a; u] gets a utility of NfF (u) +
a21[1   F (u)]g and each consumer in [u; b] gets u   p + Nfa12F (u) + [1  
F (u)]g: Uncertainty in valuation means that consumers are identical ex ante,
hence they have the same willingness to pay for the system. This determines the
original system price, which will beNfF (u)+a21[1 F (u)]g+
R b
u uf(u)du 
u[(1 F (u)]: It is also easy to nd the price of the upgrade p = u+Nfa12F (u)+
[1  F (u)]g  NfF (u) + a21[1  F (u)]g:
Therefore, the monopolist's total prots aremaxu NfF (u)+a21[1 F (u)]g+R b
u uf(u)du  u[(1 F (u)] + [1 F (u)](u+Nfa12F (u) + [1 F (u)]g 
NfF (u) + a21[1   F (u)]g): By the envelope theorem, @@a12 = @@a21 = [1  
F (u)]F (u)N 0 > 0:Hence a12 = a21 = 1 (full compatibility) maximizes monopoly
prots. Introducing uncertainty does not affect the result.
VI(ii). Uncertainty in Entry Cost
In the competitive case of the basic model, I assume that the system maker knows
the entry cost of the independent supplier and thus can ne tune its entry accom-
modation strategy. Now I consider the case in which the independent supplier's
entry cost is private information.
Suppose that entry costs, F , are represented by a cumulative distribution func-
tion G(F ). The independent supplier enters if and only if F  B0 = [t   n3 (3  
2a21  a12)]2=[2t n(2  a21  a12)]. So the system maker's expected total prots
are E(m) = m(no entry) + [m(entry)   m(no entry)]G(B0); where m(no
entry) = u + n   t. Let  = m(entry)   m(no entry): Both  and B0
increase with a12 so we must have a12 = 1: From the proof of 4, we know that
 decreases with a21 but B0 increases with a21; hence E(m) is maximized at
a21 2 (0; 1): Therefore, backward but not forward compatibility is still optimal.
18
Example 3. Suppose that entry costs are uniformly distributed on [0; t=2]. In this
case, E() /  B0 = n (a12   a21) [3t n(3 2a12 a21)]3=[2t n(2 a12 
a21)]
2:
Since @@a12 (  B0) = n (3t  3n+ na12 + 2na21)
2 (2t  2n+ na12 + na21) 3
  5nta12   12nt+ 7nta21 + 6n2 + 6t2   5n2a12   7n2a21 + n2a12a21 + 2n2a212 + 3n2a221
> 0; we have a12 = 1: The rst-order condition with respect to a21 is
@
@a21
(  B0) = n (3t  3n+ na12 + 2na21)2 (2t  2n+ na12 + na21) 3
  13nta21   nta12   12nt+ 6n2 + 6t2 + n2a12   13n2a21 + 5n2a12a21   3n2a212 + 4n2a221
= 0: Substituting a12 = 1 into the FOC, we get a21 = 0:443t=n:
Note that if the entry cost is publicly known and equals the expected value in
the private information case, i.e., F = t=4; then a21 = 0:382t=n; quite close to the
solution in the private information case.
VI(iii). New Customers
In the basic model, the system maker's choice of tying is driven by its desire to
increase the price of the original system. One may wonder whether its incentive to
tie the application changes if some customers do not make system purchases until
the second period. To answer this question, I extend the basic model by assuming
that some customers (in the size of s) enter the market in the second period and
that they are otherwise identical to customers that enter in the rst period.38
In the monopoly case, it is clear that the system maker's ex post incentive to
introduce backward but not forward compatible upgrade is strengthened because
new customers' purchases of the upgrade increases its pull to old customers. At
the same time, the system maker's ex ante incentive to make a commitment to
full compatibility remains the same. It is not difcult to see why: the system
maker's total prots will have an additional term related to the network benets
of new customers, sN [1   F (u) + s + a12F (u)], but it is increasing in a12 and
independent of a21:
In the competitive case, the existence of new customers gives the systemmaker
an incentive not to tie its application, but it is advantageous only if the number of
new customers is sufciently large. To see this, we rst observe the following:
since the system maker will set a discounted upgrade price for owners of the orig-
inal system and the independent supplier can only sell to these customers, the
earlier analysis on rms' pricing strategies involving old customers continues to
apply.
Now consider the new customer segment. Here the equivalence between un-
bundling and full compatibility breaks down. Recall that the equivalence holds
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in the basic model because old customers buy an upgrade after their system pur-
chases and the system maker cannot precommit to an upgrade price in the rst
period. New customers, however, buy the system and the application simultane-
ously, therefore a commitment to a low price in the application is readily available.
Since the system is essential for the use of the application, according to Whinston
[1990, Proposition 3], it is more protable not to tie.
 Place Figure 4 about here. 
Taking into account the competing effects of tying in the two consumer seg-
ments, we can conclude that the system maker continues to tie when it expects
relatively few new customers and chooses not to tie if it expects a large number of
new customers (see Figure 4).
VI(iv). Reversible Tie
Following Whinston [1990] and Carlton and Waldman [2002, 2006], in the basic
model I have assumed that ties are not reversible, i.e., when the system maker
tied its system and application consumers could not reverse the tie and add the
independent supplier's application. In this discussion I consider what happens if
this assumption is relaxed.
One possibility is that ties are reversible at a cost. That is, when the system
maker ties it is possible but costly for a consumer to add an alternative application.
For hardware systems, the extra cost may be the labor used to remove parts; for
software systems, it may be the hassle of changing le associations or the possible
conicts between two applications. In all these cases, if the cost is sufciently
large, then old customers will not upgrade to a tied system and attempt to undo
the tie; therefore a competition between applications will still be a competition
between two network systems, so the basic model still applies. At the same time,
if there are new customers, then they will have to incur the necessary cost to undo
the tie in order to use an alternative application. Hence, in the equilibrium, there
may be both customers who choose to reverse the tie and those who choose not to.
Suppose instead that ties are completely reversible, i.e., when the systemmaker
ties its products there is no added cost associated with consumers adding an alter-
native application onto a tied system. In this case a consumer has a third choice:
a choice of upgrading to A0B and buying B0: A consumer may choose to do so if
the price of the upgrade is lower than the additional network benets that it brings.
Since consumers value network benets the same way, price cuts by the system
maker have discontinuous payoffs. This means that when the two systems are not
fully compatible, a pure strategy equilibrium in simultaneous move pricing game
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(in period 2) does not exist. This, coupled with the multiplicity of equilibrium due
to network externalities, makes the analysis difcult.39 Nevertheless, I argue in the
following that a system maker will never nd it optimal to make the upgrade fully
compatible with the old system. In other words, it will always tie its application
to a new system, even if the tie can be reversed.
To see this, let us suppose that the systemmaker chooses a12 = 1 and a21 = 1 
"; where " << 1: Clearly this is more protable than full compatibility if the tie is
irreversible, according to the proof of Proposition 4. We just need to check whether
the system maker will follow the same equilibrium pricing strategy as in the basic
model when a tie is reversible. Note that in order to sell the upgrade to customers
who will undo the tie, the system maker must set the upgrade price below n"
and thus earn a prot in the order of " in period 2, but such a deviation cannot
be protable if " is small. Knowing this, the independent supplier also has no
incentive to change its pricing strategy. Therefore, as long as " is sufciently small,
having a reversible tie does not affect period 2 subgame equilibrium outcome.
This means that the analysis in the proof of Proposition 4 still applies: moving
away from full compatibility always increases the system maker's prots. In the
Appendix, I also show that if rms set prices sequentially in period 2, then a
pure strategy equilibrium exists, in which committing to backward but not forward
compatibility (a12 = 1; a21 = 0) is more protable than full compatibility.
VI(v). Mixed Bundling
One may wonder whether the system maker has an incentive to offer B along
with A0B: There are two possibilities, depending on whetherB is compatible with
A: First, if B is incompatible with A; then it is equivalent to selling only A0B:
Second, if B is compatible with A; then it is equivalent to selling a version of
A0B that is fully compatible with A; according to Lemma 1. Denote it by AB:
BetweenAB andA0B; the only difference is the network effects. Since users value
network effects the same way, they will make the same choice in the equilibrium.
This means that the system maker will be able to sell either AB or A0B; but not
both. Therefore, mixed bundling, offering both AB and A0B; does not increase
the system maker's prots.
VI(vi). Myopic Consumers
Although my analysis is based on the assumption of forward-looking consumers,
it is not difcult to nd the system maker's optimizing strategy when there are
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myopic consumers. A commitment in the rst period will not increase a myopic
consumer's willingness to pay, so the system maker will also act myopically and
reverse its strategy completely: in the monopoly case, it will choose to integrate
the application into an upgrade that is only backward compatible; but in the com-
petitive case, it will sell its application as a separate product or sell an upgrade
that is fully compatible with the old system. In both cases, the system maker can
introduce two systems to separate myopic consumers from forward-looking con-
sumers, with the latter group paying a premium for a system that offers a higher
second-period utility.
It is also easy to see that the above results are also obtained if the system maker
is unable to commit to its future tying strategies.
VII. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION
This paper explores a system maker's incentives to provide upgraded versions of
its system and its choice of compatibility. It shows that tying applications into
an upgrade that is only backward compatible generates higher prots when net-
work externalities are present. As a result, the system maker may introduce more
upgrades than optimal. A commitment not to upgrade or a commitment to full
compatibility may increase the system maker's total prots. However, if the sys-
tem maker faces competition from an independent supplier of applications, then it
may again introduce the upgrade, even if a commitment of not doing so is available
and socially optimal.
The market conduct of a monopoly system maker such as Microsoft has been
under constant scrutiny by regulators. A major concern of the regulators is its use
of tying as an exclusionary device. My paper suggests that tying can be harmful
even when its use by a monopolist does not lead to exclusion of rivals. Ironically,
tying is protable in my model precisely because it commits the system maker to
a vigorous competition in the application market.
Although my analysis provides arguments in favor of the hypothesis of planned
obsolescence, its welfare implications are less clear. Even in the simple models
considered here, which ignores a number of other possible motivations for the
practice, the impact of tying on welfare depends on the market structure and model
parameters. Moreover, my results are obtained under an assumption of weak net-
work externalities. This means that welfare loss, if any, may not be signicant
enough to warrant heavy-handed government interventions.
While the models presented in this paper are sufciently general, there are
some strong assumptions that can potentially be relaxed. First, the models ignore
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entry into the system market; second, the system maker's incentive to engage in
R&D is assumed to be exogenous. Future studies that incorporate more realistic
elements can help us better understand the issues discussed in this paper.
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Notes
1'Want Media Player 8? Buy Windows XP', Joe Wilcox, CNET News, April
24, 2001; 'Windows XP: The big squeeze?', Joe Wilcox, CNET News, May 21,
2001.
2For a more detailed discussion of Microsoft's bundling strategy, see Section
II.
3Backward compatibility, as formally dened later in the paper, implies partial
incompatibility.
4Other important contributions include Choi [1996, 2004], which focus on the
long-term impact of tying on competition through innovation.
5In Nalebuff [2004], bundling can be protable even if entry deterrence fails,
but goodA in his model is not essential to the use of goodB. Therefore, his model
ts well with Microsoft's bundling of Microsoft Ofce products but less so with
its bundling applications into the operating system.
6'Is Microsoft Driving Innovation Or Playing Catch-Up With Rivals?', Reply
All, The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 1, 2006.
7See a more detailed discussion on EU's mandatary unbundling in Section V.C.
8This result is also obtained in Shy [2001], Armstrong [2006], Doganoglu and
Wright [2006].
9Other important contributions to this literature includeWaldman [1996], Fish-
man and Rob [2000], Kumar [2002] and Nahm [2004].
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10In their rst model, Ellison and Fudenberg [2000] examine the consumers'
coordination problem in detail and show that the monopoly outcome can be up-
grades when the social optimum is incompatible networks.
11Choi [1994] and Ellison and Fudenberg [2000] informally discuss why back-
ward compatibility is preferred to full incompatibility. Lee [2006] formalizes this
idea and analyzes a monopolist's choice of compatibility between its successive
generations of products, but he only compares three special cases. All these mod-
els assume within generation consumer homogeneity, so their analyses and welfare
implications are different from mine. None of these models consider the role of
competition in the monopolist's upgrade decision.
12Brian Livingston, 'Microsoft Turns Up The Heat On Windows 2000 Users',
Information Week, Dec. 15, 2006.
13It should be noted that the media player market is also an example of two-
sided markets, in which content providers and nal consumers constitute the two
sides that trade with each other. Two-sided markets are characterized by indirect
network effects, a feature not accounted for in my model. Choi [2006] provides
a careful analysis of tying that takes into account the peculiarities of two-sided
markets.
14The information presented in this table has been obtained from news wires
and articles on Lexis-Nexis.
15Microsoft received heavy criticism after releasing WMP 8, which was only
available on Windows XP. WMP 9, which supported older versions of Windows,
was released more than a year after the launch of Windows XP.
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16'Microsoft Windows Media Player 7 Brings Click and Play Digital Media To
Millions Around the Globe', Microsoft Corporation, Press Release, July 17, 2000.
17'SAP promises no major software release until 2010', TechTarget, Sep. 13,
2006; 'SAP's ERP 2005 "stable core" for ve years', InfoWorld, Sep. 12, 2006.
18'SAP: A Software Giant Rarin' to Grow', BusinessWeek, June 23, 2003.
19I am grateful to an anonymous referee, who suggested the addition of this
section.
20I callB an application in order to provide concreteness, butB can refer to any
new features or improvements that increase the value of a system. See footnote 22
for further discussion.
21A positive xed cost will certainly reduce the monopolist's incentive to in-
troduce an upgrade, but this effect is quite obvious. However, the xed cost of
developing an application by a competitive supplier will play an important role in
determining the optimal degree of compatibility when I consider the price squeeze
effect of bundling in Section V.
22This assumption is without loss of generality. According to the goods-characteristics
approach, products can be viewed as bundles of characteristics they embody (Lan-
caster [1966]). Taking this approach, we can view B as simply a combination of
features not included in A:
23It is a standard assumption used in the durable goods literature, e.g., Wald-
man [1993], Choi [1994], Fudenberg and Tirole [1998] and Ellison and Fuden-
berg [2000]. It is also a routine practice adopted by real world manufacturers. For
example, Windows XP Home Edition costs $99 for the upgrade version and $199
29
for rst-time installers. Laura Rohde, 'Microsoft Reveals Windows XP Prices',
PC World, August 24, 2001.
If this assumption is not satised, then the results will change slightly in the
monopoly case, but will be quite different in the competitive case. See footnote 27
and Section V.B for more details.
24The assumption that the monopolist cannot commit to future prices is not im-
portant in my analysis of the monopoly case: its choices of tying and compatibility
will not change if the monopolist gains the ability to make a price commitment (see
the proof of Proposition 2), but is crucial in my analysis of the competitive case
(See Section V.B for further discussion). A possible justication for this assump-
tion is that such a commitment may reduce the system maker's incentive to invest
in R&D.
25This corresponds to the additive specication in Ellison and Fudenberg
[2000].
26The precise condition for this to hold depends on the functional forms ofN()
and F (); which are not specied to allow for generality. See Example 1 for one
specication.
27The equivalence result breaks down if (i) the marginal costs of production are
positive and thus an integrated system is more costly to produce than a standalone
application; (ii) the system maker cannot prevent consumers from delaying their
purchases by offering discounts to upgrading users; or (iii) there are new system
buyers in the second period. In both case (i) and (ii), the unbundling solution will
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then dominate the full compatibility solution; case (iii) is discussed in an extension
of the model (Section VI.C).
28It is worth noting that the commitment outcome can also be obtained if the
monopolist does not sell but leases its product.
29It should be noted that the welfare implication is not the same across all users:
non-upgrading users prefer full compatibility because it offers them greater net-
work benets, but upgrading users pay a higher price under full compatibility.
30The case in which F is private information is solved in Section VI(ii).
31It is worth noting that decreasing a21 has two competing effects on the system
maker's prot: on one hand, it increases the system maker's market share; on the
other hand, it intensies price competition. Interestingly, the market share effect is
dominated by the price effect. The reason is not difcult to see: a lower a21 gives
the independent supplier a greater incentive to enlarge its network through price
cuts.
32It is worth noting that the exact form of backward compatibility derived in my
model differs from the denition used in Ellison and Fudenberg [2000], according
to which users of the old version gains zero network benets from users of the new
version.
33Carlton andWaldman [2006] also show that tying can be protable if a monopoly
system maker cannot commit to upgrade prices, but their emphasis is on applica-
tion upgrades, not system upgrades. Their model predicts foreclosure, whereas
mine predicts entry accommodation.
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34It is not difcult to see that the price commitment outcome can be obtained
under a lease-only policy.
35'Windows is a piece of intellectual property whose "facilities" are totally open
to partners and competitors alike. Windows' programming interfaces are pub-
lished free of charge, so millions of independent software developers can make
use of its built-in facilities (eg, the user interface) in the applications they design.'
Bill Gates, 'Compete, Don't Delete', The Economist, June 13, 1998.
36This point was made by an anonymous referee. I gratefully acknowledge the
insight.
37It is worth noting that entry of the independent supplier is inefcient if F >
t=4; and in such a case the systemmaker's incentive to accommodate entry induces
inefcient entry.
38I do not specify an exogenous attrition process because attrition is endogenous
in my model: rst-period consumers who choose not to upgrade leave the market
in the second period.
39Since consumers are heterogeneous, they may not all have the same ordering
of the possible equilibria, so we cannot use a Pareto criterion to select between the
equilibria. Suppose that the price of the new system is between n and n(1   x);
then a user on the immediate left of x prefers all users upgrade (she can now use
B0), and a user on the immediate right of x prefers not to upgrade (cost exceeds
the benet.)
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APPENDIX
(i). Sequential Move Pricing In Period 2
In the following, I assume that the systemmaker sets prices before the independent
supplier in period 2. I look for an equilibrium, in which all players have beliefs
that consumers who prefer the alternative application will upgrade and undo the
tie if pA0B  n but will choose not to upgrade if pA0B > n. These beliefs are
consistent with consumers' choices.
Proposition 6. Suppose that the system maker chooses backward but not forward
compatibility (a12 = 1; a21 = 0) and t9(11   2
p
10) < n < t; then a pure strat-
egy equilibrium exists in the sequential move pricing game. In this equilibrium,
pA0B = n and pB0 = t2 ; all consumers upgrade but
1
4 of them undo the tie and buy
an application from the independent supplier.
Proof. It is easy to see that the independent supplier and consumers will not devi-
ate from their equilibrium strategies. We just need to verify the system maker has
no incentive to deviate from its equilibrium price. If pA0B > n; then consumers
who prefer the alternative application will choose not to upgrade and prices will
be set as if the tie were irreversible. Solving, we get pA0B = (3t   n)=2; pB0 =
(5t  3n)=4 and mjt=2 = (n  3t)2 =8(2t  n): But mjt=2 is smaller than n; the
system maker's period 2 prot when pA0B = n.
According to Proposition 6, if the system maker chooses only backward com-
patibility, then consumers are willing to pay u   34t for the original system. This
gives the systemmaker a total prot of u+n 34t;which is greater than u+n 2116t;40
its prot under full compatibility, or u + n   t; its prot when the independent
supplier is excluded. Interestingly, some consumers will undo the tie, yet the tie
forces all consumers, including those who will undo the tie, to buy the upgrade
and allows the system maker to extract rents from its rival.
It is also straightforward to verify that if n  t9(11  2
p
10); then a pure strat-
egy equilibrium exists such that consumers who buy the alternative application
keep the old system. In this equilibrium, pA0B = 12(3t   n); pB0 = 54t   34n: The
system maker earns a total prot of u + n+ 18 (n  3t) (3n   7t)=(n   2t); still
greater than its prot under full compatibility.
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